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A B S T R A C T
Background: Studies have found that children with Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) are
more likely to make errors in appropriately producing referring expressions (‘the dog’ vs.
‘the black dog’) than are controls but comprehend them with equal facility. We tested
whether this anomaly arises because comprehension studies have focused on manipulat-
ing perspective-taking at a ‘generic speaker’ level.
Method: We compared 24 autistic eight- to eleven-year-old with 24 well-matched neuro-
typical controls. Children interpreted requests (e.g. ‘Can I have that ball?’) in contextswhich
would be ambiguous (i.e. because the child can see two balls) if perspective-taking were
not utilized. In the interlocutor-specific perspective-taking condition, the target was the
particular object which was new for the speaker.
Children needed to take into account what the speaker had played with before and the fact
that they were now expressing excitement about something new. In two control ‘speaker-
generic’ conditions we tested children’s ability to take the visual perspective of the speaker
(where any speaker who stood behind a particular barrier would have the same
perspective).
Results: The autistic groupwere significantly less likely to select the target and significantly
more likely to request clarification in the ‘interlocutor-specific’ condition. Performance in
the ‘interlocutor-generic’ (visual) perspective taking conditions did not differ between
groups.
Conclusion: Autistic children, even those who are not intellectually-impaired, tend to have
more difficulty than neuro-typical peers in comprehending referring expressionswhen this
requires understanding that people comment on what is new for them.
© 2019 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
7 1. Introduction
8 One of the two key symptom domains for Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) encompasses deficits in verbal social
9 communication (DSM-5, APA, 2013). A significant hurdle to studying this atypicality is that, while we can readily notice it in
10 everyday conversation, it is challenging to create experimental conditions that reliably elicit language which is appropriate
11 (or not) for a given context. One type of language use that is so pervasive as to be open to experimental study is reference.
* Corresponding author at: Kent Child Development Unit, School of Psychology, University of Kent, Keynes College, Canterbury CT2 7NP, UK.
E-mail address: K.Abbot-Smith@kent.ac.uk (K. Abbot-Smith).
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.rasd.2019.101465
1750-9467/© 2019 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Research in Autism Spectrum Disorders xxx (2019) xxx–xxx
G Model
RASD 101465 1–11
Please cite this article in press as: K. Abbot-Smith, D. Williams and D. Matthews ‘What’s new for you?’: Interlocutor-specific
perspective-taking and language interpretation in autistic and neuro-typical children. Research in Autism Spectrum Disorders
(2019), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rasd.2019.101465
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Research in Autism Spectrum Disorders
journal homepage: ht tp : / /ees .e lsevier .com/RASD/defaul t .asp
12 Referring to something verbally requires selecting an expression (e.g., “the dog”, or “it” or “the dog over there with the red
13 collar”) that is sufficiently, but not excessively, informative. Deficits in selecting appropriate referring expressions in
14 production are characteristic of ASD (see Malkin, Abbot-Smith, & Williams, 2018, for a systematic review). That is, autistic
15 individuals frequently fail to tailor language for specific interlocutors (conversation partners) (Volden, Magill-Evans,
16 Goulden, & Clarke, 2007). In contrast, studies that have tested the comprehension of referring expressions have not observed
17 significant ASD-specific difficulties with the ability to use the perspective of the interlocutor to interpret referring
18 expressions. While this discrepancy is surprising, it is plausibly explained by the fact that studies of reference
19 comprehension in ASD to date have only manipulated fairly simple forms of perspective-taking. It is therefore possible that
20 autistic children experience difficulties in comprehending referring expressionswhen comprehension requires interlocutor-
21 specific perspective-taking – i.e., consideration of mental content (knowledge, interests) relating to a specific individual and
22 how this differs from the mental content of others. The purpose of the current study was to test this possibility with a
23 reference interpretation task that required participants to consider what was ‘new’ to the interaction from the interlocutor’s
24 perspective.
25 To understand the importance of this manipulation it is necessary to first consider the socio-cognitive abilities that are
26 likely to be required in everyday interactionwhen interpreting referring expressions used byanother speaker. For example, if
27 your partner asks you to ‘pass the screwdriver’, when you can see two screwdrivers, to successfully understand which
28 screwdriver is meant, you need to consider your partner’s perspective. In some sense, the listener needs to step into the
29 speaker’s shoes in order to interpret which referent (here: which screwdriver) is intended. Most theorists agree that some
30 type of Theory of Mind or Mentalising process, at least in a broad sense, must be involved in interpreting referring
31 expressions in these types of situations (Apperly & Butterfill, 2009; Clark & Marshall, 1981). There are many potential
32 dimensions to Mentalising. One dimension concerns whether the child needs to consider another’s affect (or emotional
33 stance towards something) versus whether the child needs a cognitive understanding of the other individual (e.g.
34 understanding what the individual does or does not know). Another dimension toMentalising concerns the degree towhich
35 the child needs to consider whether various individuals might have differing perspectives (i.e. interlocutor-specific
36 perspective-taking).
37 Individuals with ASD tend to perform significantly less well on Theory ofMindmeasures than do neuro-typical peers (e.g.
38 White, Hill, Happé, & Frith, 2009). Moreover, difficulties with a dynamic consideration of the perspective of others in real
39 time in more naturalistic situations (Peterson, Garnett, Kelly, & Attwood, 2009) are strong predictors of social functioning
40 (Berenguer, Miranda, Colomer, Baixauli, & Rosello, 2018; Jones et al., 2018). Yet, four out of the five studies of referring
41 expression interpretation to date have found no significant differences between individuals with ASD and matched neuro-
42 typical controls (TDs) (Begeer, Malle, Nieuwland, & Keysar, 2010; Malkin, Abbot-Smith, Williams, & Ayling, 2018;
43 Santiesteban, Shah, White, Bird, & Heyes, 2015; Volden, Mulcahy, & Holdgrafer, 1997).1 One possible reason for this is that
44 most of these studies only manipulated interlocutor-generic perspective-taking; that is, the perspective of the speaker
45 would be the same, regardless of the identity of the specific speaker. A good example of why we consider these tasks
46 interlocutor-generic is ‘the director task’, which is frequently used to assess how listeners interpret referring expressions
47 (e.g. ‘the duck’ vs. ‘the big duck’). In this task, the participant and speaker (director) sit on either side of a grid containing
48 various objects, some of which are occluded from the director’s view. Thus, when the director asks the participant to (for
49 example) ‘Pick up the duck’, the participant needs to consider whether the director has visual access (or not) to both the
50 ducks visible to the participant. Importantly, any interlocutor positioned in the director’s seat would have the same
51 perspective in this task - the participant is not required to consider the potential differences between individuals in terms of
52 their past experiences of or affect towards certain objects.
53 In contrast, in many situations in everyday life, individuals need to consider the interlocutor-specific perspective of a
54 speaker in order to successfully interpret referring expressions. For example, in a scenario inwhich you and your partner can
55 both see two screwdrivers and she asks you to ‘Pass me the screwdriver’, the statement itself is underspecified (i.e. it would
56 not, in itself, allow you to identify the referent). However, if you have both previously established that only one of the two
57 screwdrivers is suitable for the flatpack furniture you are constructing, then determining the referent would be
58 straightforward. This type of perspective-taking requires you to consider knowledge which is specific to your partner by
59 virtue of their past experiences and the common ground you have built up with them; you would not draw the same
60 conclusion regarding referential intent if your partner were somehow replaced by another individual with no prior
61 experience of constructing flatpack furniture. Thus, to utilise interlocutor-specific perspective, a listener needs to consider
62 individual differences in cognitive content (e.g. remembering what the partner does or does not know – either through
63 verbal transmission or by tracking his/her experience) or individual differences in affective stance (i.e. what certain people
64 like or are interested in) (see Moll & Kadipasaoglu, 2013, for a similar discussion).
1 The fifth study – by Schuh, Eigsti, andMirman (2016) - only found impairments relative to typical controls for their gaze fixations measure (and not for
object selection accuracy). Crucially, even for the gaze fixations measure, the difference to typical controls was in fact subject to a three-way interaction
between group, perspective-taking condition and working memory, whereby the autistic group were more impaired than the neuro-typical group when
required to use perspective-taking under high working memory load conditions. Thus, the impairment in the autistic group did not appear to lie in
perspective-taking ability, but rather they were more susceptible to the performance limitations imposed by working memory.
2 K. Abbot-Smith, D. Williams and D. Matthews / Research in Autism Spectrum Disorders xxx (2019) 101465
G Model
RASD 101465 1–11
Please cite this article in press as: K. Abbot-Smith, D. Williams and D. Matthews ‘What’s new for you?’: Interlocutor-specific
perspective-taking and language interpretation in autistic and neuro-typical children. Research in Autism Spectrum Disorders
(2019), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rasd.2019.101465
65 To our knowledge, there is only one study to date that aimed to examine the role of interlocutor-specific perspective-taking
66 in the interpretation of referring expressions by childrenwith and without ASD (Malkin, Abbot-Smith,Williams, and Ayling,
67 2018: Study 1). In Malkin, Abbot-Smith, Williams, and Ayling’s (2018) study, speaker perspective was manipulated in the
68 followingway. First, the participant partially constructed one toy (e.g. awoodpecker) with one experimenter (in the absence
69 of the second experimenter), then the participant partially constructed a different toy (e.g. a telephone) with a second
70 experimenter (in the absence of the first experimenter). Then, one of the two experimenters handed the participant a
71 missing piece (e.g. string) that could complete either toy and told her ‘Now you can do it’. Success in the task required the
72 child to track the experience of specific interlocutors; the target referent for the ambiguous pronoun ‘it’ was the one which
73 was ‘old’ or ‘given’ information for the speaker. Autistic children were just at good at this task as neuro-typical controls.
74 Malkin, Abbot-Smith, Williams, and Ayling’s (2018) task certainly required participants to track the interlocutor-specific
75 experiences and to trace the pronoun that the interlocutor used back to the discourse that was specific to that particular
76 interlocutor. This is interesting, since this anaphor resolution must be carried out in an interlocutor-specific manner.
77 However, it is possible that children did not really need to consider how their own perspective differed from that of another
78 individual inMalkin et al.’s task, which is still fairly simple compared tomany of the real world perspective-taking situations
79 that children regularly encounter. It is certainly the case that (amongst other factors) Malkin et al.’s task did not require the
80 participants to consider the affective component of interlocutor-specific perspective-taking. This is important as affect
81 interpretation plays such a frequent role in reference interpretation and perspective-taking more generally in everyday life.
82 There are two routes by which a listener might be able to determine an individual’s affect in everyday situation. The first
83 simply requires interpreting the individual’s bodily cues to their affect. However, since individuals very often conceal (or
84 attempt to conceal) these bodily cues in everyday life, another important route to determining likely affect is through
85 simulation (e.g. Harris, 1992). That is, if I know I dislike it when Fred calls me names, then I can fairly safely assume that Tom
86 also dislikes it when Fred calls him names.
87 In the current study, we examined the ability to utilise interlocutor-specific perspective through this simulation
88 route. That is, if I know that I tend to be more interested in toys that I have never seen before, then I can assume that the
89 speaker is also more likely to be interested in a toy that she has never seen before. To investigate this, we adapted a
90 paradigm developed by Tomasello and Haberl (2003) and Moll and Tomasello (2007). In the Moll and Tomasello (2007)
91 paradigm, the child first jointly engages with the Requester (R) with one novel object and then a second novel object. At
92 this point, R leaves the room and the child jointly engages with a second experimenter with a third novel object (the
93 target). Finally, R returns to the room and says from the doorway ‘Wow! Cool! Give it to me!’whereby the child and R can
94 see three novel objects. Typically-developing toddlers are above chance in interpreting the referring expression ‘it’ as
95 referring to the object that is new for the requesting experimenter (Requester).
96 In contrast to the study byMalkin, Abbot-Smith,Williams, and Ayling (2018), in this ‘excitement at the new’ paradigm, the
97 child needs to understand that R is interested in the object that is new for R and, thus, likely to comment on this (see Clark,
98 Schreuder, & Buttrick, 1983). The ability to interpret R’s affect and the distinctive prosodic contour employed when
99 commenting on new and exciting things would probably also play a role in this task. In sum, successful performance in this
100 task may require the integration of several processes including an understanding of interlocutor-specific experience (and
101 how this might result in one object thus appearingmore salient), an understanding that others tend to comment on the new
102 as well as the ability to interpret affect and prosody. The integration of these elements with the mechanisms of reference
103 interpretation is a much more complex process than any previously manipulated in a reference interpretation task with
104 individuals with ASD. However, these are the types of processes likely to be frequently required in interlocutor-specific
105 perspective-taking in spontaneous real-life interaction (see Graham, San Juan, & Khu, 2017).
106 In the current study, we tested autistic children and neuro-typical controls aged between eight and eleven years, matched on
107 age, non-verbal IQ, receptive language, andgender. In our adaptation ofMoll andTomasello (2007),we told each child (C) that one
108 experimenter (E2)hadbought toys that theRequester (R)hadnotyetseen.Foreach trial, E2passedoneof these (e.g.,pinkball)over
109 to R, who discussed this with C. Then R left and E2 showed C another object of the same lexical type (e.g., yellow ball). When R
110 returned, she and C could see both objects. R said “Oh wow, I like that ball. Can you put that ball in my box?”. The key dependent
111 variables were object choice (i.e. whether the child selected the object that was new for R) and number of clarification
112 questions (as a measure of uncertainty). Participants also completed two interlocutor-generic perspective-taking control
113 conditions. As for the experimental (interlocutor-specific) conditions, the two interlocutor-generic conditions also involved a
114 choicebetweentwoobjects of the same lexical type (e.g. twocars) for each trial but required thechild to take the interlocutor’s
115 visual perspective into account. Thefirst such interlocutor-generic condition alignedwith previous studies in the literature in
116 requiring the child to utilise information about what the speaker could perceive. The second interlocutor-generic condition
117 required the child to utilise information about how the speaker perceived each object (which colour they perceived it to be).
118 1.1. Research questions
119 1.1.1. Research question 1. Are autistic children impaired relative to typical controls in their ability to take the ‘excitement at the
120 new’ into account when interpreting referring expressions?
121 We predicted that autistic children would select the correct object less often and would produce more clarification
122 questions thanwould typical controls in the interlocutor-specific condition. In contrast, we predicted that therewould be no
123 significant between-groups differences on the interlocutor-generic control conditions for either dependent variable.
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124 1.1.2. Research question 2. Are autistic difficulties with taking ‘excitement at the new’ into account related to impairments in affect
125 recognition?
126 Success in the Tomasello and Haberl (2003)/Moll and Tomasello (2007) paradigm could plausibly depend in part on the
127 ability of children to recognise excitement on the part of the Requester. Autistic children have previously been found on
128 average to have difficulty with affect recognition (e.g. Golan, Baron-Cohen, & Golan, 2008). We therefore assessed all
129 participants on a (standardised) non-verbal measure of affect recognition (NEPSY II, Korkman, Kirk, & Kemp, 1998), which
130 has been widely used in the ASD emotion recognition intervention literature (e.g. Williams, Gray, & Tonge, 2012) and on
131 which autistic children have been found to score on average lower than their typical peers (e.g. Loukusa, Maekinen,
132 Kuusikko-Gauffin, Ebeling, & Moilanen, 2014). We investigate, first, whether there are significant between-groups
133 differences on the NEPSY II affect recognitionmeasure and, second, whether there is a relationship between performance on
134 this measure and our experimental task.
135 2. Method
136 2.1. Participants
137 We tested 60 children aged between eight and eleven years, of which 32 were neuro-typical and 28 were autistic. From
138 this sample, we excluded eight neuro-typical children because their IQ scoreswere too high to allow them to bematched and
139 one child because his parent did not return the SRS questionnaire. We also commenced testing with but excluded four
140 autistic children, two because they scored outside the typical range on either non-verbal IQ or receptive language and two
141 because they became too distressed/non-compliant for testing.
142 Our final sample thus consisted of 48 children with 24 in each diagnostic group. Of the neuro-typical group 15 were
143 recruited through the Kent Child Development Unit database and the rest via three mainstream primary schools. Of the
144 autistic group, eight attended specialist provisions for autistic children, ninewere recruited via a local county autism support
145 service, six were recruited via the Kent Child Development Unit database and one was recruited via a mainstream primary
146 school. Children in the autistic group had been diagnosed within the British National Health Service either by a clinical
147 psychologist or a paediatrician. Parents of children in both groups completed the Social Responsiveness Scale (SRS,
148 Constantino & Gruber, 2007). T-scores of 76 or higher are in the severe autism range.
149 Autistic and neuro-typical children were matched on chronological age, core language and non-verbal IQ. To assess core
150 language, we carried out a receptive language test, namely the Following Directions sub-test, from the Clinical Evaluation of
151 Language Fundamentals1 - Fifth Edition (CELF1-5, Wiig, Semel, & Secord, 2013). To assess non-verbal IQ, we carried out the
152 Matrix Reasoning subtest from theWechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence II (Wechsler, 2011). The cognitive profiles of the
153 final sample are shown in Table 1 below. Written consent was obtained from a parent of each individual child. Each
154 individual child also gave his or her verbal assent.
155 2.2. Procedure and measures
156 2.2.1. Overall procedure
157 The Requester (R) wore dark sunglasses during the study. On first meeting the child, R explained (showing the child a
158 large box inwhich therewere already toys) that shewas busy organising a play event andwould therefore have to often leave
159 the room. The experimental trials were presented as ‘breaks’ from the standardised (non-verbal IQ, core language, NEPSY
160 affect recognition) and Theory of Mind tests (Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985; Happé, 1994; Sullivan, Zaitchik, & Tager-
161 Flusberg, 1994), and were interspersed between them. The order of administration of the standardised measures was:
162 Receptive language, Non-verbal IQ, NEPSY II affect recognition and finally the Theory of Mind tests, which are outlined in the
Table 1
Cognitive profile of the children who were included.
Autistic (n = 24; 18 males) Neuro-typical (n = 24; 18 males)
Mean (SD) Mean (SD) p d
Chronological Age in Months 120.04 (13.87) 118.13 (14.91) .65 0.13
Receptive language scaled scorea 10.13 (2.88) 10.71 (2.70) .47 0.21
Non-verbal IQ T-scoreb 46.58 (8.92) 49.42 (6.87) .22 0.36
Social Responsiveness Scale T-score 88.13 (4.22) 45.92 (7.02) <.001 7.40
Theory of Mind Compositec 3.52 (1.13) 4.27 (0.93) .02 0.72
a Following Directions sub-test of CELF1-5 (Wiig et al., 2013).
b Matrix Reasoning sub-test of the WASI II (Wechsler, 2011).
c This consisted of one point for the first order change of location task (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985), three points for the ‘Birthday Surprise’ test of second
order false belief understanding (Sullivan et al., 1994) and two points for the ‘Kittens’ (white lie) vignette from Happé’s (1994) ‘Strange Stories’ (max. = 6
points). See appendix for details.
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163 in the appendix. After the test of receptive language, we counterbalanced across participants within each group whether
164 children experienced an experimental (interlocutor-specific) trial first or a control (interlocutor-generic) trial first.
165 2.2.2. Affect recognition
166 To assess affect recognition, we used the NEPSY II standardisedmeasure (Korkman et al., 1998). Initially, the participant is
167 shown for each item a picture at the top of a page of a child with the facial affect of a basic emotion (happiness, anger,
168 sadness, neutral, fear or disgust). The participant is asked to select from a series of faces at the bottom of the page the child
169 (different child) ‘who feels the samewayas the child at the top’. For some items, the participant has to select two target faces.
170 For other items, the participant has to retain the affect in short term memory while selecting targets.
171 2.2.3. Experimental task: interlocutor-specific perspective-taking ‘What is new for you?’
172 The child sat behind a table facing an open door. E2 sat at the short end of the table to the left of the child. R sat facing the
173 child. In the interlocutor-specific perspective-taking condition, R first stated that E2 had just bought some toys that even R
174 had never seen. E2 then pulled out a box and took out the first item (e.g. a Spidermanwhose head turns around) and put it in
175 the centre of the table whilst ensuring that neither R nor the child could see the remaining items in the box. R made a least
176 two comments about the object to the child. These two commentswere semi-scripted (e.g. Rmight say ‘Oh, a spiderman! He’s
177 very bendy. Oh look – his head turns around like an owl’) but if the child made spontaneous comments about the object, R
178 followed in on the child’s comments. Comments were always about the specific object and not about that type of object in
179 general. R allowed the child to handle the object and they engaged in joint attention for around 10–20 seconds. E2 then put
180 the first object back into the box and retrieved a second object of the same lexical type (e.g. a Spiderman holding a web
181 shooter). R and the child again engaged in joint attention for 10–20 seconds focussed on the second object, againmaking two
182 to three semi-scripted comments. For example, R might say “This spiderman seems to be holding a web shooter. Oh look! If you
183 squeeze his legs like this, you can make the web shooter turn round”. During the handling of both objects, E2 did not comment
184 and R was interested but not excited.
185 R then made an excuse (e.g. ‘oh, I forgot I need to quickly speak to Mr X. Back in a minute’) and left the room, whereupon E2
186 pushed the second object to a corner of the table and brought out a third object of the same lexical type (e.g. a Spiderman
187 with transparent legs and power boosters). Child and E2 engaged in joint attentionwith the third object for 10–20 seconds.
188 This was again partially scripted, as for R’s comments about the other two objects. For example, E2might say ‘This looks like a
189 water-filled Spiderman. He has power boosters on his feet. Would you like to hold him?”. E2 then ensured that the two objects
190 (foil vs. target) were each in one corner of the table, to the left and right of the child, and coughed to signal that R could re-
191 enter the room. R’s affect on appearing in the doorway was surprised and delighted. Neither object was occluded from R’s
192 view. From the doorway she said “Wow! Look at THAT [TOY NAME]! Can you put that [TOY NAME e.g. ball] in my box?”. Since R
193 stood equidistant from the two potential referents andwaswearing dark glasses, this utterancewas always ambiguous if the
194 child did not take the prior shared experience with R into account.
195 The target was the object that R had not previously seen (i.e. was ‘new’ for R) and the foil was the object with which the
196 child had jointly engaged in attending to with R. There were three trials per participant. Every trial where the child selected
197 the target object was given a score of one. If the child selected the foil object (i.e. the object with which the child and R had
198 previously jointly engaged), this was given a score of zero. If the child picked up both objects and put them both into the box,
199 this was also given a score of zero. If the child was already touching an object when R walked into the room, this trial was
200 coded as ‘unscoreable’ and hence missing data. This occurred on 0.7 % of trials. For this reason proportion scores were used
201 for the object-selection dependent variable. Children sometimes also made clarification requests (e.g. ‘Which ball?’). These
202 were transcribed and the frequency with which they were made was taken as a measure of uncertainty.
203 Each child experienced three experimental trials. Target object location was counterbalanced so it was on the left-hand
204 side of the child two out of three times for half of each group (and one out of three times for the other half of each group).We
205 also counterbalanced across participants which object of a pair (e.g. flashing ball vs. spiky ball) was the target. Therewere six
206 pairs of possible objects. The particular three pairs used for a particular participant was counterbalanced across participants.
207 All objects were familiar to this age group in the UK at the time of testing, and were found in pilot testing to usually be of
208 interest to autistic children.
209 2.2.4. Interlocutor-generic perspective-taking conditions
210 Prior to each interlocutor-generic trial, R made an excuse (e.g. ‘Oh, I think I’ve forgotten my keys in the cloakroom. Back in a
211 second.’) and left the room. In the interlocutor-generic ‘what-perceived’ condition, E2 then placed two objects in front of the
212 child. An opaque cardboard occluderwas placed in front of one object so that it could not be seen fromR’s perspective.When
213 R reappeared in the doorway, she was initially looking in her box of toys. She then looked up and said in an offhand manner
‘Ah, I’ve been looking for that [TOY NAME, e.g. ball]. Since R stood equidistant from the two potential referents andwaswearing
214 dark glasses, this utterance was always ambiguous if the child did not take into account that one object was hidden from R’s
215 perspective. The target was the non-occluded object. The particular three object pairs assigned to a participant was
216 counterbalanced across participants. Some of the object pairs overlapped with the experimental condition and some
217 overlapped with the other interlocutor-generic perspective-taking condition outlined below.
218 In the second interlocutor-generic perspective-taking condition, the child needed to take into account how the
219 interlocutor perceived the objects that, in reality, were always white. In these trials, E2 placed two objects in front of the
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220 child, whereby a transparent colour filter occluder (along the lines of that used in Moll & Meltzoff, 2011) was placed in front
221 of one object so that it appeared to be a different colour (red, yellow or blue) from R’s perspective. An example trial is shown
222 in Fig. 1 below. When R reappeared in the doorway, she was initially looking in her box of toys. She then looked up in a
223 distracted manner and said in an offhand manner ‘Ah, I’ve been looking for that ADJECTIVE [TOY NAME, e.g. blue balloon]. For
224 one of the three trials per participant, the colour adjective used was ‘white’ and thus the non-filtered object was the target.
225 For the other two interlocutor-generic ‘how-perceived’ trials per participant, the colour adjective specified the filtered
226 object. Since R stood equidistant from the two potential referents and was wearing dark glasses, this utterance was always
227 ambiguous if the child did not take into account that one object was not white from R’s perspective. For all interlocutor-
228 generic ‘how-perceived’ trials, the target was the object that matched the colour from R’s perspective.
229 Across the six control trials (three for interlocutor-generic-‘what’ and three for interlocutor-generic-‘how’ perspective-
230 taking) the target object side was counterbalanced within and across participants. The specific object of a pair that was a
231 target was also counterbalanced across participants. As for the experimental condition, every control trial where the child
232 selected the target object was given a score of one. Similarly, if the child selected the foil object or both objects and put them
233 both into the box, this was also given a score of zero. As for the experimental condition, if the child was already touching an
234 object when Rwalked into the room, this trial was coded as ‘unscoreable’. Two additional situations occasionally occurred in
235 the control conditions, resulting in unscoreable trials: 1) if the child pulled both objects out from behind the screens before
236 the test questionwas asked or 2) if the child indicated that he or shewas revealing information to R (e.g. bymoving the object
237 from behind the opaque barrier and saying, for example, ‘there’s this one as well’). Over the interlocutor-generic trials, 3 % of
238 trials were unscoreable for object choice and thus we used proportion scores. In addition to object choice, - as for the
239 experimental condition - we also scored the usage of clarification questions in the control conditions.
240 2.2.5. Post-test compliance control task
241 Because we were worried that autistic children might differ from neuro-typical controls at the group level in terms of
242 their desire to comply with experimenter requests per se, at the end of the entire testing session, each participant
243 participated in three ‘compliance control’ trials. In this trials, they were asked to put one of a pair of objects (different lexical
244 types e.g. robot vs. helicopter) into the box. All participants scored 100 % on compliance.
245 2.2.6. Reliability
246 The first author coded all the trials for object choice. A second coder scored object choice for 77 % of the dataset.
247 Agreement was very good between the two coders (Cohen’s k = .88). The first author also transcribed and counted all
248 clarification requests (e.g. ‘Which one?’) and a second coder coded eight of the 48 children (i.e. 17 % of data), with excellent
249 inter-rater agreement (ICC = 0.952, p< .001).
250 3. Results
251 3.1. Research question 1. Are autistic children impaired relative to neuro-typical controls in taking the ‘excitement at the new’ into
252 account when interpreting referring expressions?
253 3.1.1. Control interlocutor-generic perspective-taking measures
254 Table 2 shows the performance of autistic and neuro-typical participants in the two interlocutor-generic perspective-
255 taking control tasks. There were no between-groups differences for either object choice or frequency of clarification
256 questions for either the ‘what’ or ‘how’ interlocutor-generic perspective-taking tasks. Table 2 shows that all effect sizes for
[(Fig._1)TD$FIG]
Fig. 1. View from the perspective of the participant (here: in an interlocutor-generic condition).
6 K. Abbot-Smith, D. Williams and D. Matthews / Research in Autism Spectrum Disorders xxx (2019) 101465
G Model
RASD 101465 1–11
Please cite this article in press as: K. Abbot-Smith, D. Williams and D. Matthews ‘What’s new for you?’: Interlocutor-specific
perspective-taking and language interpretation in autistic and neuro-typical children. Research in Autism Spectrum Disorders
(2019), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rasd.2019.101465
257 between-groups differences were small in magnitude. Both groups of participants selected the correct object at levels
258 significantly above chance, with effects that were large inmagnitude, all ts> 4.99, all ps < .001, all ds > 1.02. Success on these
259 tasks amongst autistic participants fits with previous literature examining how listeners utilise information about what the
260 speaker seeswhen interpreting referring expressions (Begeer et al., 2010; Santiesteban et al., 2015; Volden et al.,1997). In the
261 context of the current study, it suggests that any significant between-groups difference in our experimental condition cannot
262 be explained by demands of engaging with a referential communication task.
263 3.1.2. Experimental ‘excited about the new’ condition
264 Table 3 shows that Autistic participants (M = 0.63, SD = 0.39) selected the correct object (i.e., the one that was new for the
265 Requester) significantly less frequently than did neuro-typical participants (M = 0.81, SD = .23), (t(23) = 2.06, p< .05,
266 d = 0.57). The neuro-typical children selected the target object at well above chance levels, associated with a large effect size
267 (t(23) = 6.77, p< .001, d = 1.38), which shows that they assumed that R was excited about and commenting on the object that
268 was new for her. In contrast, the performance of the autistic group did not differ from chance, t(23) = 1.59, p = .13, d = 0.32),
269 indicating that as a group autistic children did not necessarily make this assumption. The same results were found for our
270 clarification request measure. The autistic group asked significantly more clarification questions in our ‘excited about the
271 new’ experimental task (M = 1.67, SD = 1.50) than did the neuro-typical group (M = 0.79, SD = 1.10), t(23) = 2.31, p< .05,
272 d = 0.67, indicating that they showed greater uncertainty as to R’s referential intent. In sum, we find support for our
273 hypothesis that autistic children struggle, relative to neuro-typical controls, to consider what is new for the interlocutor
274 when interpreting referring expressions.
275 3.2. Research question 2. Are autistic difficulties in taking ‘excitement at the new’ into account related to difficulties with affect
276 recognition?
277 One plausible reason why the autistic children differed significantly from well-matched controls on our experimental
278 task is that success may have required the ability to interpret R’s excited affect. Table 4 shows that the between-groups
279 difference in affect recognition on the NEPSY II was not significant (t(46) = 1.40, p = .17, d = 0.40). The mean scaled scores for
280 both groups surrounded the population mean of 10 (autistic M = 9.79, SD = 2.52; neuro-typical M = 10.83; SD = 2.67). More
281 importantly, we examined whether performance on the NEPSY task correlated with performance in the experimental
282 (interlocutor-specific perspective-taking) condition. This was not the case for the autistic group, nor for the neuro-typical
283 group, nor for the groups conflated (see Table 5 below for effect sizes). Thus, it is unlikely that affect recognition explains the
284 group differences in the comprehension of reference.
Table 2
Between-groups comparisons for the interlocutor-generic perspective-taking control measures.
Autistic Neuro-typical
Mean (SD) Mean (SD) p d
WHAT: object choice (proportion correct) 0.79 (.26) 0.87 (.26) .27 0.13
HOW: object choice (proportion correct) 0.79 (.28) 0.90 (.17) .10 0.47
WHAT: clarification requests (raw frequency) 0.83 (1.09) 0.58 (1.21) .46 0.22
HOW: clarification requests (raw frequency) 1.29 (2.79) 0.88 (1.94) .55 0.17
Table 3
Between-groups comparison for the experimental ‘excitement at the new’ condition.
Autistic Neuro-typical
Mean (SD) Mean (SD) p d
Object choice (proportion correct) 0.63 (.39) 0.81 (.23) .045 0.57
Clarification requests (raw frequency) 1.67 (1.50) 0.79 (1.10) .026 0.67
Table 4
Performance on affect recognition.
Autistic (n = 24; 18 males) Neuro-typical (n = 24; 18 males)
Mean (SD) Mean (SD) p d
NEPSY II Affect Recognition 9.79 (2.52) 10.83 (2.67) .17 0.40
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285 3.3. Secondary analyses
286 Performance in the experimental (interlocutor-specific perspective-taking) task was also not correlated for the autistic
287 groupwith either age, non-verbal IQ, receptive language, affect recognition, autistic symptoms or Theory ofMind). The same
288 is true for the neuro-typical group.2 See Table 5 below for all relationships with the experimental measure dependent
289 variables, by group.
290 4. General discussion
291 The current study was the first to test whether autistic children have difficulty interpreting referring expressions in a
292 tasks that goes beyond requiring basic, interlocutor-generic perspective taking. In the current study, the participants had to
293 consider which element was new to the discourse from the speaker’s perspective (given shared past experience) in order to
294 correctly interpret otherwise ambiguous use of referring expressions (i.e. ‘that ball’when both speaker and listener could see
295 two balls). We compared 24 eight- to eleven-year-old autistic children with 24 well-matched neuro-typical controls. For
296 both dependent variables (object choice and clarification questions), we found significant differences between the groups,
297 indicating that while neuro-typical children assumed that the Requesting Experimenter was excited about and referring to
298 the object that was new for her, the autistic group was less likely to do so. In contrast, for the interlocutor-generic
299 perspective-taking control tasks, there were no significant between group differences for either dependent variable. This
300 aligns with the previous four reference interpretation studies with autistic individuals (Begeer et al., 2010; Santiesteban
301 et al., 2015; Schuh et al., 2016; Volden et al., 1997).
302 4.1. Accounting for autistic difficulties with interlocutor-specific perspective-taking
303 This raises the question ofwhat exactly constitutes the difficulty that autistic individuals had in our ‘excitement about the
304 new’ experimental task. A number of non-mutually exclusive possibilities warrant further exploration. To succeed on our
305 task, one needs to 1) retrieve amemory about a specific interlocutor’s experience, 2) understand the emotional tone of the test
306 question and emotional affect of the speaker and 3) understand that people comment on new things. Malkin, Abbot-Smith,
307 Williams, and Ayling (2018) already established autistic children can retrieve a memory about a specific interlocutor’s
308 experience. Indeed, all bar one of our participants passed a First Order False Belief test, which is accepted as being
309 developmentally subsequent to Knowledge-Access (Pratt & Bryant, 1990). However, either of the other points may be
310 challenging for a child on the autism spectrum, as might juggling all these constraints at once.
311 We think it unlikely that the difficulties of the autistic group can be reduced to basic facial affect recognition. First, there
312 were no group-level differences in non-verbal affect interpretation as assessed by the standardised NEPSY task. Second,
313 there was no relationship between the autistic group’s performance in the interlocutor-specific condition and their NEPSY
314 affect recognition scores. However, while there is no clear-cut evidence that autistic individuals are necessarily impaired in
315 behavioural measures of affect recognition, review papers tend to find much clearer evidence of affect recognition
316 impairmentswhen using electrophysiological, eye-tracking or brain imagingmeasures (e.g. Harms,Martin, &Wallace, 2010).
317 Thus, one possibilitywhich needs further exploration is whether autistic children find it more difficult than do neuro-typical
318 children to integrate an interpretation of emotion with the interpretation of reference. A second possibility for future
319 investigation is whether difficulties interpreting the emotional tone of the speaker’s request might have contributed to
320 diminished performance in our autistic group (although a number of studies suggest comparable performance for autistic
321 children and neuro-typical controls when using prosody to interpret pragmatic intent, see e.g. Wang, Lee, Sigman, &
322 Dapretto, 2006).
Table 5
Correlations with the ‘excitement at the new’ dependent variables, by group.





Object choice Clarification Questions
NEPSY Affect Recognition raw !0.06 !0.04 !0.12 0.29 !0.05 0.06
Theory of Mind composite 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.21 0.12 !0.04
Core language (CELF) raw !0.14 0.04 0.07 0.20 !0.04 0.06
IQ (Matrices) raw score 0.03 !0.28 0.11 0.15 0.10 !0.18
SRS questionnaire raw score 0.09 0.31 0.16 !0.05 !.248 .36*
Age in months !0.05 !0.20 0.15 !0.06 0.00 !0.10
8 p< .1.
* p< .05.
2 The same pattern of results was found if tau was used rather than Pearson’s r.
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323 One aspect of our interlocutor-specific perspective-taking task which probably did pose difficulties for autistic children is
324 the need to be sensitive to the fact that the requester was more likely to comment on the object that was new (for her). That
325 is, in Clark et al.’s (1983) terms, the object which is new to the discourse is assumed to be more salient. This is taken for
326 granted by neuro-typical children in the earliest stages of language acquisition (e.g., Akhtar, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 1996;
327 Bannard, Rosner, &Matthews, 2017; Tomasello & Akhtar,1995) and evenpre-linguistically (Moll & Tomasello, 2007; O’Neill &
328 Happé, 2000). Indeed, the tendency of neuro-typical language users to comment on elementswhich are new to the discourse
329 is so strong that certain patterns are typologically marked (e.g. DuBois, 1987, see also Chafe, 1976). However, it is not
330 something that is demonstrated by preschool autistic children (O’Neill & Happé, 2000).
331 One possibility here is that if an autistic individual is not him or herself necessarilymore interested in elementswhich are
332 new to the discourse, then he or she should find it more difficult than a neuro-typical children to simulate that their
333 interlocutor finds the new object more salient. Another possibility is that some autistic children do themselves find new
334 objects more interesting but do not necessarily realise that people tend to comment on new rather than given elements in
335 the discourse. Either of these possibilities would have profound consequences for spontaneous conversation and might in
336 fact be related to impairments in conversation skills more generally, including a tendency to monologue on favourite topics
337 (e.g. Nadig, Lee, Singh, Bosshart, & Ozonoff, 2011). It is therefore critical that future studies attempt to tease apart the source
338 of this difficulty.
339 4.2. Limitations and considerations for future research
340 Wedid not find any correlations between our Theory of Mindmeasures, on the one hand, andwith the ability to interpret
341 referring expressions on the experimental task, on the other hand; not even in the experimental condition requiring
342 interlocutor-specific perspective-taking, which arguably requires mentalising of some sort. This might because each Theory
343 of Mind task and each of our experimental perspective-taking tasks assesses different aspects of mentalising. That is, it may
344 be that childrenmaster each aspect of social cognition in a fairly piecemealway. An alternative test, such as Reading theMind
345 in the Eyes (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, Raste, & Plumb, 2001) for example, might correlate with interlocutor-specific
346 perspective-taking.
347 One limitation of the current study is that wewere unable to control the prosody of the test questions absolutely, because
348 they were uttered ‘live’ by the Requester. A second limitation is that due to our sample size of 48, we were only able to
349 compare the autistic and neuro-typical children at the group level.
350 4.3. Summary and conclusions
351 In sum, the current study is the first to demonstrate empirically that autistic children have greater difficulties than do
352 neuro-typicals in the interpretation of referring expressions. We argue that the reason this is the first such demonstration is
353 that the aspect of perspective-taking manipulated in our task requires a deeper level of consideration of the mental states
354 than the perspectives and degree of requisite cue interpretation manipulated in previous studies. Future research is needed
355 to investigate which particular components of interlocutor-specific perspective-taking pose difficulties for autistic
356 individuals.
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373 Appendix A.
374 Theory of Mind Composite
375 Our Theory ofMind compositewas administered in a stepwisemanner (see Charman et al., 2011, for a similar procedure).
376 We first administered a test of second order Theory of Mind developed by Sullivan et al. (1994), accompanied by pictures, in
377 which a mother has a false belief about the mental state of the son (i.e. she doesn’t know that he knows that she has bought
378 him a puppy for this birthday). At the end of the story the tester asks the child three questions aboutwhat themotherwill tell
379 another person, if she is asked whether her son knows what he is getting for his birthday. If the child failed all of the above
380 second-order false belief test questions, the test administrator administered a first order ‘change of location’ false belief tasks
381 (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985). If, however, the child passed two out of three second order false belief questions, he or she was
382 credited with passing first order false belief. Finally, we administered one item (‘Kittens’) from Happé (1994), in which the
383 child is told a story and then asked why a protagonist lied. The answer is scored on a three-point scale in terms of the child’s
384 ability to explain that the protagonist wishes to persuade another person to do something. We also used Happé’s (1994)
385 physical inferencing burglar and mouse story as a control for inferencing ability per se. Only one typically-developing child
386 and three autistic children failed this measure.
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